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NONMILITARY STRATEGIES AND COMPETITION FOR POWER:
THE NEED FOR EXPANDED REGULATION OF COERCION

By Walter L. Williams, Jr.*

The general focus of this brief paper is on the use of coercive strategies
in the global power process in which states as the principal participants
(but also, other groups) strive to maximize power positions-the control
over persons, territory, resources, and institutions (political, economic,
etc.). Interaction in the use of coercive strategies is in tum a processthe coercion process, in which participants for varying objectives use
diplomatic, ideological, economic, and military strategies coercively with
deprivational impact ranging from quite low levels (e.g., a mild diplomatic reproach) to extremely high levels (e.g., major destruction oflife
and property in full scale armed combat). 1
The more specific focus here is on the use of nonmilitary strategies in
this competition for power. As our world community becomes ever more
interdependent as to all values, nonmilitary strategies, which may be
referred to generally as diplomatic (communications to government
officials), ideological (communications addressed to the mass audience
comprising the populace of the target state(s)), and economic (restrictions
on access to raw materials, goods, services, markets, finances, etc.), can
have increasingly coercive impact. Diplomatic communications convey*Associate Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School ofLaw, College ofWilliam & Mary.
1
This process of coercion is described in detail in M. S. McDoUGAL & F. FEUCIANO,
LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, Ch. 1 (1961).
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ing threats of imminent and substantial military or economic coercion,
or propaganda attacks designed to erode popular support of specific
governmental policy or to incite revolt, obviously may have major impact
upon the target state and achieve the power objectives of the initiator of
the coercion more promptly and at far less cost than application of armed
force. Global telecommunications technology dramatically increases the
ability to bring these strategies to bear. However, the susceptibility today
of many states to economic coercion perhaps deserves principal attention.
The Arab oil embargo after the Arab-Israeli conflict of October 1973,
dramatized the ability of a state, or a group in combination, controlling
the major portion of a crucial natural resource to cause substantial damage
to national economies. Similarly, one or more states may refuse access to
much needed financial institutions, to scientific or technical knowledge,
etc., all with quite coercive effects, or they may boycott supplier states,
i.e., close access to principal markets for sale of raw materials or finished
products. Other effects could be substantial damage' to well-being (lower
standard ofliving, hunger, even famine), to the basic power positions of
target states, and to other values. Paust and Blaustein, in their article,
"The Arab Oil Weapon-A Threat to International Peace,"2 dramatically
describe possible immediate outcomes and longer-range effects of such
-coercion. In short, today, economic strategies could have adverse consequences far more extensive than the bombing of a city or other military
actions that would call into play international decisionmaking processes
and prescriptions designed to regulate and limit such armed coercion.
Perhaps, the crucial issue for this seminar is the question: Does international law regulate at all the use of economic strategies, and other nonmilitary strategies, having substantial coercive impact? Until this century,
states used all strategies, military and otherwise, to whatever levels of
coercion desired, without regard to whether they were authorized by law.
The long, arduous process of development of community policy seeking
maximum emphasis on use of persuasive rather than coercive strategies,
and particularly to render significant use of armed force impermissible
except for community approved objectives, finally culminated-only in
the lifetime of many living today-in the first crude prescriptions oflaw
regulating the use of armed force and the establishment of still highly
imperfect community processes of decision to pass on the permissibility
of particular applications of armed force. That principal attention has
been focused on the application of armed force probably has been, and
still is, warranted. Surely, the most crucial need for any community is to
establish and maintain legal regulation of armed force. Further, until
recent times, the relatively uncomplex economic structures of states, and
their lesser degree of interdependence, rendered states less susceptible
to prompt and intense coercion from economic strategies, or other
strategies. For example, modern means of mass communication have
become available just at the time that so many national societies have
become especially susceptible to ideological coercion due to hostile per2

68 AJIL 410 (1974).
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spectives based on race, religion, culture, political and economic beliefs,
disparity in economic development, etc.
As to the question whether the trend of legal decision has kept pace
with economic coercion, I am dubious. One can find a plenitude of
formally announced community policy that decisionmakers could apply
to determine the permissibility of particular acts of economic coercion.
There is the general policy of maintaining minimum world public order,
of limiting to the fullest extent possible the substantial deprivation of
values and regulating coercion to serve only community approved objectives. One could apply various policy provisions in the UN Charter (the
Preamble, Arts. 1 and 2, etc.) and related documents, and regional accords
(e.g., Art. 19 of the OAS Charter). In recent years, a series ofUN resolutions have condemned economic coercion. A few examples: the 1965
General Assembly's Declaration on Non-Intervention, providing that no
state "may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other
type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the
subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights or to secure from it
advantages of any kind."; the General Assembly's 1970 Declaration on
Friendly Relations, which repeats this statement; and the Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States, adopted by General Assembly
Resolution 3281 in 1974. These and many other resolutions are cited and
discussed at length in Paust and Blaustein.
That these manifold expressions of community policy provide an adequate base to authorize regulation of economic coercion is indisputable
(Parenthetically, many of these provisions likewise could be applied to
coercive use of diplomatic and ideological strategies.) Some writers find
that international law does indeed presently regulate economic coercion.3
Others are either strongly suggestive or quite positive that present
international law does not regulate economic coercion.4 I suggest,
reluctantly, that the latter view appears more accurately to gauge the past
trend of decision. (I am not referring to the case whether economic
coercion in general or in particular detail is regulated by specific agreement between certain states.) I suggest that although community policy
favoring regulation of economic coercion exists, the will of decisionmakers to apply that policy and to commit resources to insure adherence
to that policy does not, to date. I suggest that we are observing a process
of policy development, not application. For prescribed standards of
conduct to be law, they must be both authoritative and controlling. I do
not see control applied; I do not see in the past conduct of states adherence to prescriptions regulating economic coercion; I do not see governmental expectations that other governments will limit economic coercion
to instances authorized by community policy, or else, be effectively
3

See Paust & Blaustein, supra note 2.
See I. Shibata. Destination Embargo of Arab Oil: Its Legality under International
Law, 68 AJIL 591 (1974); J Boorman, Economic Coercion in International Law: The Arab
Oil Weapon and the Ensuing juridical Issues, 9 J. INT'L L. & EcoN. 205 (1974); J. Muir,
The Boycott in International Law, id. 187.
4
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sanctioned for departure from prescription. I note that Messrs. Paust and
Blaustein in discussing expressions of community policy cite little if any
evidence of past general adherence to that policy, or even of governmental claim of violation of international law by acts of economic
coercion, in settings of specific disputes. Even in the case of the Arab oil
embargo, with its substantial adverse impact on many states, I have found
no governmental claims that such conduct was impermissible under
international law. The United States was a principal target of the
embargo. Yet, in November 1973, and January 1974, Secretary Kissinger
expressed "full understanding" for the Arab action and could "unqerstand reasons" for the embargo. Even as late as March 1974, with the
embargo continuing after all the U.S. peace efforts, he resorted only to
tougher diplomatic language, without reference to legal claim, that the
embargo "could affect the attitude with which we will have to pursue
our diplomacy." I know of no governmental communications at that time;
no governmental actio~s initiated in any informal or formal arena that
claimed, much less resulted in a decision, that economic coercion in
general, or the Arab oil embargo in particular, was subject to regulation
under international law. Where is meaningful state conduct? Writers such
as Muir, Boorman, and Shihata,5 describe a multitude of instances of past
resort to substantial economic coercion by states without regard to the
question of community authorization. In other sessions at this Annual
Meeting, we have heard various lawyers in our government speak of the
extensive use of economic coercion by or against the United States,
without even raising the question ofpermissibility of such coercion under
international law. There is indeed a "loud silence" on this issue. I submit
that in the face of contrary formal expressions of community policy, state
conduct implicitly, but overwhelmingly, demonstrates that the past trend
of decision has been that states may engage in economic (and other
nonmilitary) coercion and counter-coercion without regulation under
general international law.
Whether a trend is presently developing toward legal regulation is also
uncertain. Policy cries out for it as our economic interdependence rapidly
increases and the world community has been sensitized to the problem by
the Arab oil embargo. However, we are in what seems to be a retrograde
period as concerns commitment to common interests. Substantial additional damage may have to occur from such unregulated coercion before
we have policy effectively applied as controlling prescription.
Finally, what might we do to promote accelerated achievement of
community policies seeking legal regulation of coercive nonmilitary
strategies? Fundamental to this problem is the continuing lack of
favorable perspectives of governmental officials. We could work to alter
these perspectives by educating officials as to: (a) the increasing global
interdependence in all values and the risks thereto entailed in using
such strategies; (b) the questionable efficacy in achieving desired objectives through using such strategies, while resulting perhaps in much more
5
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damage than anticipated to all participants through escalating coercion
and counter-coercion; and (c) the positive outcomes anticipated from
subjecting coercive nonmilitary strategies to regulation under international law. Concurrently, we could also be working on recommendations of more specific prescriptions of policy concerning the use of
coercive nonmilitary strategies and of guidelines for decisionmakers in
the process of applying those prescriptions in specific cases. As to the
criteria to apply, we might study the utility of using much the same
criteria as are used in assessing the permissibility of military strategies
(e.g., first initiator of coercion, objectives of the coercion, intensity and
proportionality of deprivational impact, opportunity for use of persuasive
strategies of dispute settlement, opportunity for prior resort to community agencies competent to pass on permissibility of the exercise of
the coercion, etc.).6 I have disagreed with the above-cited article by
Paust and Blaustein to the extent that those writers appear, in this case,
too ready to presume general adherence to policy merely because formal
expressions of policy exist. Nevertheless, their comprehensive,
contextual, policy-oriented approach illustrates how we might seek to
accomplish the tasks I have outlined here.
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See McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 1, especially Ch. 3, for suggestive discussion.

